Sunday, March 30, 2003
Quinta feira, 27 de março, tivemos no Ibmec a visita e conversa de Diane Cabell, de Harvard. O assunto foi a questão do domínio público autoral e das restrições continuadas e acrescidas à informação e criatividade, resultantes de esse acréscimo de direitos. Tenho repetido esse tema faz muitos anos, mas fiquei extremamente surpreso de confirmar a posição franca e aguerrrida de parte considerável do corpo docente de Harvard quanto ao tema. Ou Anátema, talvez.
Friday, March 14, 2003
Índia.
Por alguns anos, convivi nas reuniões da WIPO e na UNCTAD com meus colegas indianos. Eles, e o Brasil, líderes da frente única do terceiro mundo, o Grupo dos 77'. Hábeis, extremamente preparados, tão eficazes na peleja diplomática quanto o nosso povo do Itamarati. Como uma lula (a marítima) capazes de escapar de todos impasses despejando a tinta negra do seu inglês rapidíssimo e inexpugnável.
Menos de uma semana de trabalho em Mumbai (ou Bombaim...) mostra que é possível tecnologia - e da casta "alta tecnologia" - num país grotescamente desigual. Camelos fora carregando bosta de vaca para ser usada como combustível, e software com o mais alto nível de confiabilidade e segurança sendo escrito dentro dos prédios.
Agora deixam entrar xerox, e a pepsi e coca voltaram ao país depois de muitos anos de proibição. O país recusa quase todos os mandamentos do consumo, aliás não só por ideologia.
Mas vendem tecnologia ao Bil Gates, e ao Brasil. Exportam resmas de cientistas. A primeira patente de engenharia genética teve como inventor um tal de Chakrabarty. Por favor, me repitam dez mil vezes "o Brasil perdeu a vez da tecnologia por causa da reserva de mercado". Repitam, que eu quero acreditar.
Ah, os carros fabricados pelo meu cliente indiano são melhores, de melhor tecnologia, e mais sofisticados dos que os fabricados no Brasil pelas subsidiárias de multinacionais.
Por alguns anos, convivi nas reuniões da WIPO e na UNCTAD com meus colegas indianos. Eles, e o Brasil, líderes da frente única do terceiro mundo, o Grupo dos 77'. Hábeis, extremamente preparados, tão eficazes na peleja diplomática quanto o nosso povo do Itamarati. Como uma lula (a marítima) capazes de escapar de todos impasses despejando a tinta negra do seu inglês rapidíssimo e inexpugnável.
Menos de uma semana de trabalho em Mumbai (ou Bombaim...) mostra que é possível tecnologia - e da casta "alta tecnologia" - num país grotescamente desigual. Camelos fora carregando bosta de vaca para ser usada como combustível, e software com o mais alto nível de confiabilidade e segurança sendo escrito dentro dos prédios.
Agora deixam entrar xerox, e a pepsi e coca voltaram ao país depois de muitos anos de proibição. O país recusa quase todos os mandamentos do consumo, aliás não só por ideologia.
Mas vendem tecnologia ao Bil Gates, e ao Brasil. Exportam resmas de cientistas. A primeira patente de engenharia genética teve como inventor um tal de Chakrabarty. Por favor, me repitam dez mil vezes "o Brasil perdeu a vez da tecnologia por causa da reserva de mercado". Repitam, que eu quero acreditar.
Ah, os carros fabricados pelo meu cliente indiano são melhores, de melhor tecnologia, e mais sofisticados dos que os fabricados no Brasil pelas subsidiárias de multinacionais.
Thursday, February 20, 2003
Intellectual what?
"Under the law, intellectual property is treated as if it were property."
Under Brazilian Law, it is a reasonable proposition - "as if it were property". That's to say - it is _not_ property at all, but for a legal fiction it is to be treated as such, to the limits and purposes of that fiction...but no further. Licenses are dealt in the IP code in an extremely short fashion; therefore, the Civil Code rules on lease apply. That's just application of the principle jus abhorret vacuum. Exclusive rights on non-self-equal goods are similar enough to exclusive rights on self-equal goods to allow for analogical rules to be used. The right to keep the asset on which crucially necessary improvements were made could therefore be applied to licensed patents, albeit the silence of the IP code. The common economic and equitable base seems to grant that.
But you can grant licenses to multiple persons; oh, yes, you can lease the same apartment to many persons, but some annoyance would result to at least some of the shier tenants. Analogy is a useful tool, but is just a makeshift appliance.
"Under the law, intellectual property is treated as if it were property."
Under Brazilian Law, it is a reasonable proposition - "as if it were property". That's to say - it is _not_ property at all, but for a legal fiction it is to be treated as such, to the limits and purposes of that fiction...but no further. Licenses are dealt in the IP code in an extremely short fashion; therefore, the Civil Code rules on lease apply. That's just application of the principle jus abhorret vacuum. Exclusive rights on non-self-equal goods are similar enough to exclusive rights on self-equal goods to allow for analogical rules to be used. The right to keep the asset on which crucially necessary improvements were made could therefore be applied to licensed patents, albeit the silence of the IP code. The common economic and equitable base seems to grant that.
But you can grant licenses to multiple persons; oh, yes, you can lease the same apartment to many persons, but some annoyance would result to at least some of the shier tenants. Analogy is a useful tool, but is just a makeshift appliance.
Tuesday, February 18, 2003
Court and Government decisions
Due to a very imperfect wording of the 1998 Brazilian Copyright Law, court decisions and other official legal documents have been argued as being held in property by their authors. In one egregious case, the Law School of which I am the dean has been successfully sued by the subscriber of a officially published legal opinion by a Brazilian SEC house attorney, utilized for straight academic purposes during a short term course. The opinion has a mandatory, that's to say, normative, character and was collected from SEC's website.
Should this trend go on, legislators would be able to dispense with their salaries, and live on the proceeds of their good works. And so would judges.
Due to a very imperfect wording of the 1998 Brazilian Copyright Law, court decisions and other official legal documents have been argued as being held in property by their authors. In one egregious case, the Law School of which I am the dean has been successfully sued by the subscriber of a officially published legal opinion by a Brazilian SEC house attorney, utilized for straight academic purposes during a short term course. The opinion has a mandatory, that's to say, normative, character and was collected from SEC's website.
Should this trend go on, legislators would be able to dispense with their salaries, and live on the proceeds of their good works. And so would judges.
Public domain - property rights assured to the public?
A roman system jurist would probably distinguish between property rights enjoyed by the public at large and liberties. Liberties are however possession-protected, as anyone can (in some jurisdictions) claim possession (even not exclusive...) of a throughway if a squatter prevents the liberty to use it.
Therefore, possession, as the free use of a public domain utility may be recognized as an economic right even though property does not actually falls into the hands of the public at large.
This analysis of public domain (on American legal concepts) has been very convincingly advanced by the market failure theorists.
A roman system jurist would probably distinguish between property rights enjoyed by the public at large and liberties. Liberties are however possession-protected, as anyone can (in some jurisdictions) claim possession (even not exclusive...) of a throughway if a squatter prevents the liberty to use it.
Therefore, possession, as the free use of a public domain utility may be recognized as an economic right even though property does not actually falls into the hands of the public at large.
This analysis of public domain (on American legal concepts) has been very convincingly advanced by the market failure theorists.
Public domain as a right of humanity
The problem, as I see, is not the rights of man. Is one of vested rights. Given the significant difference between legal systems, on most roman tradition systems, a right of free use subject to a certain delay of time is a vested right albeit not immediately enforceable (as to the free use). All the means to preserve the flow and end of time as assured at moment zero are however allowed.
Once a exclusive right is acquired, subject to a definite time, all the persons excluded from the enjoyment by the acquisition have a rightful expectation of free use when the time expires. If such expectation is assimilable to an easement or a vested right is certainly a question of jurisdiction. But only so.
I notice that in Sears, Roebuck & Co. V. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), the court said:
"During that period of time no one may make, use, or sell the patented product without the patentee's authority. But in rewarding useful invention, the "rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. To that end the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced. (...)
Ø when the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article - including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented - passes to the public.
The problem, as I see, is not the rights of man. Is one of vested rights. Given the significant difference between legal systems, on most roman tradition systems, a right of free use subject to a certain delay of time is a vested right albeit not immediately enforceable (as to the free use). All the means to preserve the flow and end of time as assured at moment zero are however allowed.
Once a exclusive right is acquired, subject to a definite time, all the persons excluded from the enjoyment by the acquisition have a rightful expectation of free use when the time expires. If such expectation is assimilable to an easement or a vested right is certainly a question of jurisdiction. But only so.
I notice that in Sears, Roebuck & Co. V. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), the court said:
"During that period of time no one may make, use, or sell the patented product without the patentee's authority. But in rewarding useful invention, the "rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded. To that end the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced. (...)
Ø when the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article - including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented - passes to the public.
Can you establish a registration-for-prorogation requirement in copyright?
I would not think Berne plus TRIPs would be violated. Once the minimum term provided by such Agreements are complied with, any further extensions would arguably be free from their scope. See Article 5, paragraph (1) of Berne (...as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention). Convention plus TRIPs specially grants to all a term, with all the trimmings, including the no-formality rule. Beyond that, national legislation is on a freehold.
Therefore, the registration-for-extension (in excess of TRIPs minimum term) requirement would not be violative. On the other hand, the first registration is already infringing....except if we accept the convenient but dubious interpretation that U.S. Laws can impose locally the registration that would be void under Berne.
I would not think Berne plus TRIPs would be violated. Once the minimum term provided by such Agreements are complied with, any further extensions would arguably be free from their scope. See Article 5, paragraph (1) of Berne (...as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention). Convention plus TRIPs specially grants to all a term, with all the trimmings, including the no-formality rule. Beyond that, national legislation is on a freehold.
Therefore, the registration-for-extension (in excess of TRIPs minimum term) requirement would not be violative. On the other hand, the first registration is already infringing....except if we accept the convenient but dubious interpretation that U.S. Laws can impose locally the registration that would be void under Berne.
Why Berne Convention has chosen a 50 year term for copyright
Reading the very sensible Guide to Berne Convention by Masouyé, WIPO's Official book on the convention:
7.4. It is not merely by chance that fìfty years was chosen. Most countries have felt it fair and right that the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should be covered, i.e., three generations. Clearly the justice of the period varies; it depends always on the length of the author's life and the difference between cases in which he is cut off in his youth or becomes a centenarian cannot be avoided. But it is generally felt normal to add to the author's lifetime a period long enough to allow his heirs to profit from his work while they remember him. Experience has shown that, when an author is dead, his works sometimes fall into a sort of limbo from which they may or may not emerge some time later. In any case, apart, perhaps, from books and certain dramatico-musical works. modern means of exploiting works often make the length of the term of copyright of little financial importance to the users: the latter negotiate blanket licences with the authors' representatives to use large repertoires and normally the lapse into the public domain of any given work makes little difference to the amount they pay. For all these reasons, this minimum period laid down in the Convention seems to provide a fair balance between the interests of authors and the need for society to have free access to the cultural heritage which lasts far longer than those who contributed to it.
Reading the very sensible Guide to Berne Convention by Masouyé, WIPO's Official book on the convention:
7.4. It is not merely by chance that fìfty years was chosen. Most countries have felt it fair and right that the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should be covered, i.e., three generations. Clearly the justice of the period varies; it depends always on the length of the author's life and the difference between cases in which he is cut off in his youth or becomes a centenarian cannot be avoided. But it is generally felt normal to add to the author's lifetime a period long enough to allow his heirs to profit from his work while they remember him. Experience has shown that, when an author is dead, his works sometimes fall into a sort of limbo from which they may or may not emerge some time later. In any case, apart, perhaps, from books and certain dramatico-musical works. modern means of exploiting works often make the length of the term of copyright of little financial importance to the users: the latter negotiate blanket licences with the authors' representatives to use large repertoires and normally the lapse into the public domain of any given work makes little difference to the amount they pay. For all these reasons, this minimum period laid down in the Convention seems to provide a fair balance between the interests of authors and the need for society to have free access to the cultural heritage which lasts far longer than those who contributed to it.
On the tax incentive to promote donating works to public domain
The issue is lost when you suggest that a tax incentive should be given to induce authors to donate works to public domain. Economic analysis (it would seem to me) would think that proposal quite a paradox.
The Government incentive already exists. Copyright in itself is an artificial (although necessary) Government interventive action to induce authors to create. If public interest advises that works should remain in public domain, just cease or limit the incentive already granted. Can you imagine a Government subsidy to plant wheat, and a second one to pay for the fuel for burning the same wheat? Oh, that happened in Brazil with coffee, but then , as Charles de Gaule said, Brazil is not a serious country.
The issue is lost when you suggest that a tax incentive should be given to induce authors to donate works to public domain. Economic analysis (it would seem to me) would think that proposal quite a paradox.
The Government incentive already exists. Copyright in itself is an artificial (although necessary) Government interventive action to induce authors to create. If public interest advises that works should remain in public domain, just cease or limit the incentive already granted. Can you imagine a Government subsidy to plant wheat, and a second one to pay for the fuel for burning the same wheat? Oh, that happened in Brazil with coffee, but then , as Charles de Gaule said, Brazil is not a serious country.
Tangible property and intangibility - a metonymic property
"When property is SOLD, the owner does not still have it. When you SELL your creative works to the public via publication, copyright law allows you to continue to hold your property (for all practical purposes) for your entire lifetime plus 70 years."
There is a small precision to be made. "When property is SOLD, the owner does not still have it. " This is a quite precise statement. "When you SELL your creative works to the public via publication..." Sell" in this context is a metonym. Is a loose term used outside the field of law to denote other things not germane to the legal concept of selling. Like "selling the presidential candidate's image", what is something that is sold but not necessarily bought.
Selling is something that requires res, pretium et consensum, agreement and price, but most of all requires the existence of a thing - a certain and determinable thing, unique and equal to itself. Creative works (as Blackstone puts it) exists in contemplation, and lack the uniqueness plus self-equality properties.
"When property is SOLD, the owner does not still have it. When you SELL your creative works to the public via publication, copyright law allows you to continue to hold your property (for all practical purposes) for your entire lifetime plus 70 years."
There is a small precision to be made. "When property is SOLD, the owner does not still have it. " This is a quite precise statement. "When you SELL your creative works to the public via publication..." Sell" in this context is a metonym. Is a loose term used outside the field of law to denote other things not germane to the legal concept of selling. Like "selling the presidential candidate's image", what is something that is sold but not necessarily bought.
Selling is something that requires res, pretium et consensum, agreement and price, but most of all requires the existence of a thing - a certain and determinable thing, unique and equal to itself. Creative works (as Blackstone puts it) exists in contemplation, and lack the uniqueness plus self-equality properties.
Idea and expression in science
"at an epistemological level, scientists are concerned not with
facts, but with the relationship between facts. That makes it very easy
to blur idea/expression"
Granted that distinguishing idea and expression is not easy at all times, relations between facts is not more expression than the facts themselves. Epistemologically, res ipsa loquitur, or more precisely, things relate themselves; even though the relations conceived originally - fictionally, if you want, or hypothetically - by scientists may _have_ an expression deriving from the creator's ingenuity, they are not expressions by themselves. Especially if they are real relations and not just fancy hypothesis.
But the same goes as to non-scientific works. Music is by definition relational; either as relations in simultaneity (harmony or counterpoint) or in time (melody), the effects of that art are created by the effect of moving or boring relations of acoustic and chronological relations. Composing is weaving such relations from the facts of sound and time. However (and this is the point), neither the isolated relations (for instance, the Barrabas chord in Bach) nor the extended relations held a thematic material are protected on a exclusive basis. A theme, or musical idea, is (with all due care with excessive extension of this taking and reasonableness of such utilization) is liable to be picked and reutilized by other creators. Composing upon a theme from other authors is a time-honored usage of the music world. And this happens whether or not the theme originally created is in public domain.
"at an epistemological level, scientists are concerned not with
facts, but with the relationship between facts. That makes it very easy
to blur idea/expression"
Granted that distinguishing idea and expression is not easy at all times, relations between facts is not more expression than the facts themselves. Epistemologically, res ipsa loquitur, or more precisely, things relate themselves; even though the relations conceived originally - fictionally, if you want, or hypothetically - by scientists may _have_ an expression deriving from the creator's ingenuity, they are not expressions by themselves. Especially if they are real relations and not just fancy hypothesis.
But the same goes as to non-scientific works. Music is by definition relational; either as relations in simultaneity (harmony or counterpoint) or in time (melody), the effects of that art are created by the effect of moving or boring relations of acoustic and chronological relations. Composing is weaving such relations from the facts of sound and time. However (and this is the point), neither the isolated relations (for instance, the Barrabas chord in Bach) nor the extended relations held a thematic material are protected on a exclusive basis. A theme, or musical idea, is (with all due care with excessive extension of this taking and reasonableness of such utilization) is liable to be picked and reutilized by other creators. Composing upon a theme from other authors is a time-honored usage of the music world. And this happens whether or not the theme originally created is in public domain.
Quoting Brecht
One enterprising research, but certainly interesting, would be the quantification of identifiable prior-created, unpaid matter in major commercial works. Any doctoral thesis on the matter would be a certain hit. Fantasia and Paul Dukas plus Moussorgsky; all the Grimm's and Perrault's stories for other Disney Creations. Applying the same principles (or ends) supporting Eldred, wouldn't that be a big time theft?
Parodying Brecht, what are small time infringers, compared to a large commercial copyright holder?
One enterprising research, but certainly interesting, would be the quantification of identifiable prior-created, unpaid matter in major commercial works. Any doctoral thesis on the matter would be a certain hit. Fantasia and Paul Dukas plus Moussorgsky; all the Grimm's and Perrault's stories for other Disney Creations. Applying the same principles (or ends) supporting Eldred, wouldn't that be a big time theft?
Parodying Brecht, what are small time infringers, compared to a large commercial copyright holder?
Friday, February 07, 2003
On the enforcement of Copyright Laws in Brazil
At 10:11 06/02/03 +0200, you wrote:
Hi,
May I just add to the comment made by Linda Gruber : "Copyright is not working today as it did initially because more people are breaking the law". One has to look at why this could be happening. Perhaps too many copyright restrictions are encouraging non-compliance. If consumers in developed countries are complaining about copyright restrictions and the term of copyright being too long, think how it affects developing countries.
In most developing countries, there is a high level of illiteracy and dire poverty and many people can't afford to buy food, clothing, basic amenities, let alone buy books and expensive journals to get educated. In most instances, their only means of getting information in their quest for education is via photocopied material. Unfortunately the majority of printed works available are published by international publishers who charge very high prices and very high copyright royalties too, which most developing countries cannot afford. Even if there were funds to pay for copyright fees, the copyright laws themselves are restrictive about multiple copying, who can make copies, etc.
Too many copyright restrictions are making information inaccessible. The more restrictions, the more chance that there will be infringements. In fact, too many restrictions will encourage non-compliance. Although it can't be condoned, how else can they get information? Isn't it better to make it easier for illiterate people to learn to read by making material more available, especially in the public domain? In the end, they will become educated and perhaps buy books one day and even become authors and publishers. If they cannot get material to learn to read, they will never become literate. How will they ever read and understand the Copyright laws!! Let's face it there has to be a better balance - and extension of the copyright term is certainly not providing the balance.
D. Nicholson
South Africa
Echoing Mr. Nicholson's words from the other side of the Atlantic, non compliance tends to increase, not to reduce, when you escalate up the legal constraints without the evidence of social interest in such escalation. In a seminar in our State Supreme Court in August 2001 I asked the public (mostly trial and appellate judges) how many of them has done recently very simple acts like copying a program from TV to VTR for later viewing, or photocopying an article from a law review for their professional use. Under the current Brazilian Law, those acts are not covered by fair usage exemptions. As I expected, the whole audience indicated that at least one of those acts were an everyday occurrence. I informed the learned public they were continuing criminals, according to the very strong but impossible 1998 law.
The fact had some impact on the local press. Some comments reflected that it is unenforceable the law, the meaning of which for the people (and, as then demonstrated) for the courts are at least largely artificial or imported.
If you live along with people that are being benefited by a stepped up law, or has the idea that the rigors of the rule eventually could be as useful for the receiving as to the inflinging end, compliance is easy. When the economy benefited by the increase of rigor is not your economy, even the common sense of wrong is mainly lost. On the other hand, the argument for the maintenance of the source of production (authors must be incentivated to create, Hollywood must get money to pay for improved SciFi tired movies) are lost if the price whereby the cultural products reach the public prevents most of it to enjoy from the creation.
Statutes devised to prescribe far beyond their efficient scope are bad in themselves and damaging to the Law as a whole. Efficiency must be adaptative, and returns must be calculated taking into consideration the optimum level of loss; therefore, Copyright rules in developing countries must conform the actual needs of such country and not the one-size-fits-all system. Publishing industry return expectations must take into account that selling a record at US$ 29.00 in Hannover and Rio de Janeiro must be an easy to figure target but mostly impossible one. Tagging a Rio price to US$ 2.90 - preposterous as it would seem - would ban the pirate street vendors from the peddling areas downstairs. And raise (possibly) the industry's overall income. Stronger Copyright enforcement in Germany would prevent the Gresham's Law effect (IP was invented exactly for that - protecting markets from cheaper lke products, wasn't it?).
Stepping up of rules must be reserved for such countries where copying is just laziness or greed, or where piracy entrepeneurship is rampant. Like Canal Street in New York, where the third world gets its supply of fake Gucci under the indifferent eyes of the zero crime mayors.
This is not third world-type speech. This is just regular Law & Economics rationale. Or at least I think it is.
At 10:11 06/02/03 +0200, you wrote:
Hi,
May I just add to the comment made by Linda Gruber : "Copyright is not working today as it did initially because more people are breaking the law". One has to look at why this could be happening. Perhaps too many copyright restrictions are encouraging non-compliance. If consumers in developed countries are complaining about copyright restrictions and the term of copyright being too long, think how it affects developing countries.
In most developing countries, there is a high level of illiteracy and dire poverty and many people can't afford to buy food, clothing, basic amenities, let alone buy books and expensive journals to get educated. In most instances, their only means of getting information in their quest for education is via photocopied material. Unfortunately the majority of printed works available are published by international publishers who charge very high prices and very high copyright royalties too, which most developing countries cannot afford. Even if there were funds to pay for copyright fees, the copyright laws themselves are restrictive about multiple copying, who can make copies, etc.
Too many copyright restrictions are making information inaccessible. The more restrictions, the more chance that there will be infringements. In fact, too many restrictions will encourage non-compliance. Although it can't be condoned, how else can they get information? Isn't it better to make it easier for illiterate people to learn to read by making material more available, especially in the public domain? In the end, they will become educated and perhaps buy books one day and even become authors and publishers. If they cannot get material to learn to read, they will never become literate. How will they ever read and understand the Copyright laws!! Let's face it there has to be a better balance - and extension of the copyright term is certainly not providing the balance.
D. Nicholson
South Africa
Echoing Mr. Nicholson's words from the other side of the Atlantic, non compliance tends to increase, not to reduce, when you escalate up the legal constraints without the evidence of social interest in such escalation. In a seminar in our State Supreme Court in August 2001 I asked the public (mostly trial and appellate judges) how many of them has done recently very simple acts like copying a program from TV to VTR for later viewing, or photocopying an article from a law review for their professional use. Under the current Brazilian Law, those acts are not covered by fair usage exemptions. As I expected, the whole audience indicated that at least one of those acts were an everyday occurrence. I informed the learned public they were continuing criminals, according to the very strong but impossible 1998 law.
The fact had some impact on the local press. Some comments reflected that it is unenforceable the law, the meaning of which for the people (and, as then demonstrated) for the courts are at least largely artificial or imported.
If you live along with people that are being benefited by a stepped up law, or has the idea that the rigors of the rule eventually could be as useful for the receiving as to the inflinging end, compliance is easy. When the economy benefited by the increase of rigor is not your economy, even the common sense of wrong is mainly lost. On the other hand, the argument for the maintenance of the source of production (authors must be incentivated to create, Hollywood must get money to pay for improved SciFi tired movies) are lost if the price whereby the cultural products reach the public prevents most of it to enjoy from the creation.
Statutes devised to prescribe far beyond their efficient scope are bad in themselves and damaging to the Law as a whole. Efficiency must be adaptative, and returns must be calculated taking into consideration the optimum level of loss; therefore, Copyright rules in developing countries must conform the actual needs of such country and not the one-size-fits-all system. Publishing industry return expectations must take into account that selling a record at US$ 29.00 in Hannover and Rio de Janeiro must be an easy to figure target but mostly impossible one. Tagging a Rio price to US$ 2.90 - preposterous as it would seem - would ban the pirate street vendors from the peddling areas downstairs. And raise (possibly) the industry's overall income. Stronger Copyright enforcement in Germany would prevent the Gresham's Law effect (IP was invented exactly for that - protecting markets from cheaper lke products, wasn't it?).
Stepping up of rules must be reserved for such countries where copying is just laziness or greed, or where piracy entrepeneurship is rampant. Like Canal Street in New York, where the third world gets its supply of fake Gucci under the indifferent eyes of the zero crime mayors.
This is not third world-type speech. This is just regular Law & Economics rationale. Or at least I think it is.
Friday, January 31, 2003
Sobre o domínio público e o caso Eldred
De Linda Gruber
Novel Art
http://www.novelart.com
If your goal is to nudge languishing copyrighted works into the public domain
sooner, why not petition Congress to offer a tax incentive for donating works
that copyright holders don't plan to exploit themselves rather than thinking of
ways to unfairly push creators into giving up copyrights. Creators' heirs already
give more than other citizens. Who else in our capitalistic society is forced to
give up valuable holdings to the public domain without any compensation for
the loss of income their unique property can potentially produce?
Minha resposta:
The issue is lost when you suggest that a tax incentive should be given to induce authors to donate works to public domain. Economic analysis (it would seem to me) would think that proposal quite a paradox.
The Government incentive already exists. Copyright in itself is an artificial (although necessary) Government interventive action to induce authors to create. If public interest advises that works should remain in public domain, just cease or limit the incentive already granted. Can you imagine a Government subsidy to plant wheat, and a second one to pay for the fuel for burning the same wheat? Oh, that happened in Brazil with coffee, but then , as Charles de Gaule said, Brazil is not a serious country.
De Linda Gruber
Novel Art
http://www.novelart.com
If your goal is to nudge languishing copyrighted works into the public domain
sooner, why not petition Congress to offer a tax incentive for donating works
that copyright holders don't plan to exploit themselves rather than thinking of
ways to unfairly push creators into giving up copyrights. Creators' heirs already
give more than other citizens. Who else in our capitalistic society is forced to
give up valuable holdings to the public domain without any compensation for
the loss of income their unique property can potentially produce?
Minha resposta:
The issue is lost when you suggest that a tax incentive should be given to induce authors to donate works to public domain. Economic analysis (it would seem to me) would think that proposal quite a paradox.
The Government incentive already exists. Copyright in itself is an artificial (although necessary) Government interventive action to induce authors to create. If public interest advises that works should remain in public domain, just cease or limit the incentive already granted. Can you imagine a Government subsidy to plant wheat, and a second one to pay for the fuel for burning the same wheat? Oh, that happened in Brazil with coffee, but then , as Charles de Gaule said, Brazil is not a serious country.
Wednesday, January 29, 2003
Sobre o assunto cupuaçu, pondera João Marcos Silveira:
Embora concorde que os fatos narrados sejam absurdos, não vejo muito claramente de que maneira e a que título o INPI possa ou deva atuar com relação ao assunto.
Tais pedidos, desde que as marcas se destinem a assinalar produtos a que correspondam as designações - caso em que esbarrariam na vedação, hoje presente internacionalmente na maioria das legislações, de registro de expressões descritivas ou de uso necessário -, podem ser objeto de oposições ou outras formas de impugnação e indeferidos ex-officio ou por provocação de terceiros interessados, e os registros eventualmente deles resultantes seriam nulos, ou ao menos anuláveis, tudo de conformidade com a lei de cada país.
Não me parece que o INPI tenha possibilidade ou mesmo interesse de monitorar as marcas que são depositadas em cada país com vistas a detectar pedidos de registro que sejam formulados para nomes de produtos de origem brasileira (sejam naturais ou industrializados).
Uma alternativa a essa constante e impraticável vigilância internacional seria a criação de listas de designações de produtos que cada país queira ver salvaguardadas (com a necessária descrição dos produtos em questão, pois seus nomes somente seriam irregistráveis nas classes a eles correspondentes), depositando-se tais listas junto aos inúmeros órgãos de registro de marcas nacionais e regionais, à semelhança do que se faz com relação às denominações de origem, o que me parece igualmente difícil de se colocar em prática.
João Marcos Silveira
Com todo respeito à opinião do João Marcos, que está obviamente certo quanto às providências de longo prazo, lógico que o INPI e o Itamarati podem e devem atuar nisso. Quando no INPI, participei de várias instâncias em que, por via diplomática, casos como estes, em que o Brasil estava do lado réu, foram resolvidos sob a ótica da política internacional do País.
Negociei mesmo, por determinação direta do Ministro Delfim Neto, um acordo com a França durante a vista de João Figueiredo a Paris em 1980, para resolver um conjunto de problemas semelhantes ao do cupuaçu. Com a devida atenção para as desigualdades de poder político entre as naçoes, e as distinções de contexto, a via diplomática que matou a marca Cartier (para gravatas) - inatacável pelo Direito, pode matar a não-marca cupuaçu.
Resta apurar a veemência da noção de interesse nacional para Giscard d'Estaign e para Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.
Embora concorde que os fatos narrados sejam absurdos, não vejo muito claramente de que maneira e a que título o INPI possa ou deva atuar com relação ao assunto.
Tais pedidos, desde que as marcas se destinem a assinalar produtos a que correspondam as designações - caso em que esbarrariam na vedação, hoje presente internacionalmente na maioria das legislações, de registro de expressões descritivas ou de uso necessário -, podem ser objeto de oposições ou outras formas de impugnação e indeferidos ex-officio ou por provocação de terceiros interessados, e os registros eventualmente deles resultantes seriam nulos, ou ao menos anuláveis, tudo de conformidade com a lei de cada país.
Não me parece que o INPI tenha possibilidade ou mesmo interesse de monitorar as marcas que são depositadas em cada país com vistas a detectar pedidos de registro que sejam formulados para nomes de produtos de origem brasileira (sejam naturais ou industrializados).
Uma alternativa a essa constante e impraticável vigilância internacional seria a criação de listas de designações de produtos que cada país queira ver salvaguardadas (com a necessária descrição dos produtos em questão, pois seus nomes somente seriam irregistráveis nas classes a eles correspondentes), depositando-se tais listas junto aos inúmeros órgãos de registro de marcas nacionais e regionais, à semelhança do que se faz com relação às denominações de origem, o que me parece igualmente difícil de se colocar em prática.
João Marcos Silveira
Com todo respeito à opinião do João Marcos, que está obviamente certo quanto às providências de longo prazo, lógico que o INPI e o Itamarati podem e devem atuar nisso. Quando no INPI, participei de várias instâncias em que, por via diplomática, casos como estes, em que o Brasil estava do lado réu, foram resolvidos sob a ótica da política internacional do País.
Negociei mesmo, por determinação direta do Ministro Delfim Neto, um acordo com a França durante a vista de João Figueiredo a Paris em 1980, para resolver um conjunto de problemas semelhantes ao do cupuaçu. Com a devida atenção para as desigualdades de poder político entre as naçoes, e as distinções de contexto, a via diplomática que matou a marca Cartier (para gravatas) - inatacável pelo Direito, pode matar a não-marca cupuaçu.
Resta apurar a veemência da noção de interesse nacional para Giscard d'Estaign e para Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.
Tuesday, January 28, 2003
Custódio de Almeida, que justamente se entitula decano dos profissionais de PI no país, conclama apoio para o presidente do INPI, Luiz Otávio Beaklini, na campanha de recuperação da não-marca "cupuaçu", apropriada pela empresa japonesa Asahi. Como lembrou Lord Denning num famoso julgamento na Câmara dos Lordes em que o réu era uma empresa africana, por que pirata é só o terceiro mundo? "In our times, we knighted Francis Drake for the same feats...".
Monday, January 27, 2003
Direito do Mercado
Por um tanto de pudicícia, outro tanto de obsessão (muito justificada por vinte anos de regime autoritário) com os direitos humanos parece que o advogado tem tido vergonha de reconhecer o mercado como objeto do direito.
Pudicícia? Quem procura nos romances e contos brasileiros desde o século XIX a uso da palavra “mercado” nunca encontra uma conotação positiva. Mercado é sempre alguma coisa menos elegante, ou o lugar onde se consegue coisas mais ou menos inconfessáveis. Ainda hoje, a imprensa usa correntemente a expressão “solução de mercado” para todo tipo de eutanásia econômica. Joelmir Betting, quando exuma o termo, costuma citar Maquiavel: “"As maldades devem ser cometidas de uma só vez. As bondades podem ser oferecidas uma de cada vez."
Mas o mercado está em toda parte, sem a menor vergonha de sua importância. Na verdade, consagrada pela Constituição, que no artigo primeiro já fala de liberdade de iniciativa como fundamento de toda essa República. O direito nosso, com o contraponto da proteção ao trabalho, está inteiramente encharcado desse princípio. Em outros sistemas, como o italiano, se discute muito (o jurista Natalio Irti em particular) a oposição entre o dever de solidariedade e o mercado. A idéia de que o egoísmo de cada um é o bem de todos, o evangelho de nossos tempos, parece difícil de assimilar à solidariedade.
Mas certas tendências, das mais recentes, do direito vão reconhecendo o mercado como um objeto inevitável. O Direito do Mercado, como um ramo da prática do advogado e do jurista, foi inventado exatamente por Irti em 1983, e tem recebido nos últimos meses contribuições importantes no mundo todo. Direito de Empresa, ou de Mercado? O Código Civil, esse novo-velho em tantas coisas, parece que aqui também chega atrasado.
A Defesa da Concorrência, o Direito do Consumidor, partes necessárias do Direito de Mercado, indicam que a norma e o problema já está aí, na sensibilidade de todos, antes que se perceba a coerência e o sistema necessário. A “empresa” do Código Civil italiano e agora do nosso, é conceituada como uma operadora de atividades econômicas. Que economia? Aquela que os comercialistas de antes usavam para definir o ato de comércio: a economia do proveito, do lucro. Do mercado sempre...
Lógico que a propriedade intelectual é um segmento do Direito do Mercado. Pelo menos, depois que foram virtualmente extintos os certificados de autor de invenção, que eram o meio de proteger a propriedade das criações fora da economia de mercado.
Por um tanto de pudicícia, outro tanto de obsessão (muito justificada por vinte anos de regime autoritário) com os direitos humanos parece que o advogado tem tido vergonha de reconhecer o mercado como objeto do direito.
Pudicícia? Quem procura nos romances e contos brasileiros desde o século XIX a uso da palavra “mercado” nunca encontra uma conotação positiva. Mercado é sempre alguma coisa menos elegante, ou o lugar onde se consegue coisas mais ou menos inconfessáveis. Ainda hoje, a imprensa usa correntemente a expressão “solução de mercado” para todo tipo de eutanásia econômica. Joelmir Betting, quando exuma o termo, costuma citar Maquiavel: “"As maldades devem ser cometidas de uma só vez. As bondades podem ser oferecidas uma de cada vez."
Mas o mercado está em toda parte, sem a menor vergonha de sua importância. Na verdade, consagrada pela Constituição, que no artigo primeiro já fala de liberdade de iniciativa como fundamento de toda essa República. O direito nosso, com o contraponto da proteção ao trabalho, está inteiramente encharcado desse princípio. Em outros sistemas, como o italiano, se discute muito (o jurista Natalio Irti em particular) a oposição entre o dever de solidariedade e o mercado. A idéia de que o egoísmo de cada um é o bem de todos, o evangelho de nossos tempos, parece difícil de assimilar à solidariedade.
Mas certas tendências, das mais recentes, do direito vão reconhecendo o mercado como um objeto inevitável. O Direito do Mercado, como um ramo da prática do advogado e do jurista, foi inventado exatamente por Irti em 1983, e tem recebido nos últimos meses contribuições importantes no mundo todo. Direito de Empresa, ou de Mercado? O Código Civil, esse novo-velho em tantas coisas, parece que aqui também chega atrasado.
A Defesa da Concorrência, o Direito do Consumidor, partes necessárias do Direito de Mercado, indicam que a norma e o problema já está aí, na sensibilidade de todos, antes que se perceba a coerência e o sistema necessário. A “empresa” do Código Civil italiano e agora do nosso, é conceituada como uma operadora de atividades econômicas. Que economia? Aquela que os comercialistas de antes usavam para definir o ato de comércio: a economia do proveito, do lucro. Do mercado sempre...
Lógico que a propriedade intelectual é um segmento do Direito do Mercado. Pelo menos, depois que foram virtualmente extintos os certificados de autor de invenção, que eram o meio de proteger a propriedade das criações fora da economia de mercado.
Mickey Mouse e as patentes brasileiras
A proteção das criações intelectuais é temporária – ao contrário da propriedade dos bens materiais. Mas o que é temporário?
Na mais importante decisão deste inicio de 2003 (Eldred v. Ashcroft), a Suprema Corte Americana entendeu, por voto de 7 dos seus nove ministros, que “temporário” é aquilo que o Congresso entender que é. Prorrogar o direito autoral sobre o Mickey Mouse de 28 para 90 anos, ou trezentos, é uma questão de política legislativa, sem nenhum problema constitucional.
Problema americano. Aqui no Brasil, o Mickey continua protegido igualzinho, com prazo prorrogado pela lei de 1998, sem que ninguém suscitasse o problema no judiciário. Então é isso.
Na verdade, a discussão na Suprema Corte atinge todos nós. Ao concluir que se pode estender um direito intelectual além do prazo pelo qual foi concedido, o tribunal, cujas decisões têm respeito intelectual e criam precedente para o poder político da principal potência econômica e militar, abateu as esperanças de quem entendia que o público um dia também podia ter acesso às criações livremente. A mítica que as criações do homem passariam à humanidade.
Lawrence Lessig, o professor de Stanford que foi o advogado do caso, defendia exatamente esse princípio – a necessidade do domínio público das criações intelectuais. Depois do infausto, publicou na seção opiniões do New York Times uma sugestão alternativa: a da prorrogação mediante pagamento, após os primeiros 50 anos. Quem quiser ter direitos para sempre, pague. Assim só as obras de importância econômica (ou sentimental...) persistiriam. As demais cairiam no domínio público.
A idéia na verdade é de Richard Posner, o desembargador do Tribunal Regional Federal de Chicago e chefe da escola de Law & Economics, que tem sido considerado o maior jurista americano. No manuscrito de seu A Economia da Propriedade Intelectual, a que o autor me deu acesso por especial gentileza, a proposta é de um direito perpétuo, mas pagante. Gilbert e Shapiro, em 1990, já tinham proposto o mesmo estilo para patentes: direitos bem estreitos no alcance, mas longos, ou eternos. Eficiência econômica como único critério. O interesse social fica sem importância nessa equação
O mais importante para o Brasil, porém, é um detalhe que a imprensa americana nem mencionou ainda. A prorrogação de patentes, tratada lateralmente pelo julgado da Suprema Corte. Enfaticamente, a maioria (o voto é da ministra Ruth Ginsburg, tida por bem de direita) rejeitou a idéia de que o equilíbrio constitucional de interesses fosse igual para patentes e direitos autorais. A atenção aos direitos do público, dos investidores e dos investidores no caso das patentes (a barganha social que leva às patentes) é completamente diversa no caso das invenções do mundo industrial. A decisão no caso Eldred não se aplica de forma nenhuma às patentes.
Apesar de mencionar que, no século XIX, houve prorrogações de patentes individuais, o acórdão não muda frontalmente o princípio de que patentes não podem ser prorrogadas. Como nota o mais importante dos dois votos divergentes, continua em pé o princípio do caso Sears v. Stiffel de 1964 – um acórdão unânime no qual a Corte declarou que um estado não poderia estender o prazo de uma patente. Em nenhum lugar, apesar da visível e quase insopitável tentação de fazê-lo, a maioria declarou que uma patente poderia ser prorrogada sem violação da Constituição. O decoro e o precedente unânime não lhe permitiu tanto.
Num ambiente constitucional como Brasileiro, onde as patentes também são tratadas de forma diversa do direito autoral, Eldred não pode ser usado para justificar a prorrogação das patentes conferidas antes da atual lei (de 1996). Nas centenas de ações judiciais em curso no Brasil sobre o tema, é bom lembrar o que disse o acórdão da maioria em Eldred: “A reader of an author's writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from her reading. The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others of the inventor's knowledge”.
Uma patente prorrogada, aqui ou nos Estados Unidos, elimina o direito de todos de usar livremente a tecnologia protegida. Mas, ao limitar no momento da concessão a duração do monopólio ao dono da patente, a lei incorpora ao patrimônio de todos também o direito do uso livre da tecnologia. O público teve seu interesse de uso livre sujeito a um termo certo, e por isso, petreamente protegido pela nossa Constituição.
Denis Borges Barbosa
A proteção das criações intelectuais é temporária – ao contrário da propriedade dos bens materiais. Mas o que é temporário?
Na mais importante decisão deste inicio de 2003 (Eldred v. Ashcroft), a Suprema Corte Americana entendeu, por voto de 7 dos seus nove ministros, que “temporário” é aquilo que o Congresso entender que é. Prorrogar o direito autoral sobre o Mickey Mouse de 28 para 90 anos, ou trezentos, é uma questão de política legislativa, sem nenhum problema constitucional.
Problema americano. Aqui no Brasil, o Mickey continua protegido igualzinho, com prazo prorrogado pela lei de 1998, sem que ninguém suscitasse o problema no judiciário. Então é isso.
Na verdade, a discussão na Suprema Corte atinge todos nós. Ao concluir que se pode estender um direito intelectual além do prazo pelo qual foi concedido, o tribunal, cujas decisões têm respeito intelectual e criam precedente para o poder político da principal potência econômica e militar, abateu as esperanças de quem entendia que o público um dia também podia ter acesso às criações livremente. A mítica que as criações do homem passariam à humanidade.
Lawrence Lessig, o professor de Stanford que foi o advogado do caso, defendia exatamente esse princípio – a necessidade do domínio público das criações intelectuais. Depois do infausto, publicou na seção opiniões do New York Times uma sugestão alternativa: a da prorrogação mediante pagamento, após os primeiros 50 anos. Quem quiser ter direitos para sempre, pague. Assim só as obras de importância econômica (ou sentimental...) persistiriam. As demais cairiam no domínio público.
A idéia na verdade é de Richard Posner, o desembargador do Tribunal Regional Federal de Chicago e chefe da escola de Law & Economics, que tem sido considerado o maior jurista americano. No manuscrito de seu A Economia da Propriedade Intelectual, a que o autor me deu acesso por especial gentileza, a proposta é de um direito perpétuo, mas pagante. Gilbert e Shapiro, em 1990, já tinham proposto o mesmo estilo para patentes: direitos bem estreitos no alcance, mas longos, ou eternos. Eficiência econômica como único critério. O interesse social fica sem importância nessa equação
O mais importante para o Brasil, porém, é um detalhe que a imprensa americana nem mencionou ainda. A prorrogação de patentes, tratada lateralmente pelo julgado da Suprema Corte. Enfaticamente, a maioria (o voto é da ministra Ruth Ginsburg, tida por bem de direita) rejeitou a idéia de que o equilíbrio constitucional de interesses fosse igual para patentes e direitos autorais. A atenção aos direitos do público, dos investidores e dos investidores no caso das patentes (a barganha social que leva às patentes) é completamente diversa no caso das invenções do mundo industrial. A decisão no caso Eldred não se aplica de forma nenhuma às patentes.
Apesar de mencionar que, no século XIX, houve prorrogações de patentes individuais, o acórdão não muda frontalmente o princípio de que patentes não podem ser prorrogadas. Como nota o mais importante dos dois votos divergentes, continua em pé o princípio do caso Sears v. Stiffel de 1964 – um acórdão unânime no qual a Corte declarou que um estado não poderia estender o prazo de uma patente. Em nenhum lugar, apesar da visível e quase insopitável tentação de fazê-lo, a maioria declarou que uma patente poderia ser prorrogada sem violação da Constituição. O decoro e o precedente unânime não lhe permitiu tanto.
Num ambiente constitucional como Brasileiro, onde as patentes também são tratadas de forma diversa do direito autoral, Eldred não pode ser usado para justificar a prorrogação das patentes conferidas antes da atual lei (de 1996). Nas centenas de ações judiciais em curso no Brasil sobre o tema, é bom lembrar o que disse o acórdão da maioria em Eldred: “A reader of an author's writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from her reading. The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others of the inventor's knowledge”.
Uma patente prorrogada, aqui ou nos Estados Unidos, elimina o direito de todos de usar livremente a tecnologia protegida. Mas, ao limitar no momento da concessão a duração do monopólio ao dono da patente, a lei incorpora ao patrimônio de todos também o direito do uso livre da tecnologia. O público teve seu interesse de uso livre sujeito a um termo certo, e por isso, petreamente protegido pela nossa Constituição.
Denis Borges Barbosa
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)